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Sara Petrovski
How Does the Use of “Culture” and “Tradition” Shape 
the Women’s Rights Discourse in Transitional Serbia?
Abstract   Although social anthropologists have mostly abandoned the essentialist 
view of “culture” and “tradition”, these static notions are still frequently used in 
Serbian public discourse regarding women’s rights. I believe that analysing the 
production of cultural meaning and knowledge among different social actors and 
the state is important when exploring the implementation, transformation and 
protection of women’s rights at a local level. In this article, I shall investigate how 
“culture” and “tradition” are being constructed and used by certain right wing 
groups, political leaders, intellectuals and by the Serbian Orthodox Church. On 
one side, arguments of “culture” and “tradition” are used in order to “preserve 
the national identity” and save it from “imposed Western norms” and “Western 
imperialism”, while on the other, they are used to explain the cultural obstacles 
regarding the effective protection of women’s rights. “Tradition”, often con-
structed as a linear project of inherited “cultural” and “moral” values and practices, 
stands in opposition to the EU; therefore, it calls to be nurtured and protected 
or changed and abandoned. Consequently, I see women rights issues trapped 
into a pro-EU or against EU, pro-traditional values or pro-liberal values discourse. 
I conclude that women rights in Serbia are and probably will be affected more 
by the use and abuse of different concepts of “culture” and “tradition”.
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The aim of this article is to explore in what ways and for what purposes 
concepts of “tradition”1 and “culture” are being used in the public discourse 
related to women’s rights in contemporary, transitional Serbia. Although 
social anthropologists have mostly abandoned the essentialist (Grillo 2003) 
view of “culture” and “tradition”, these static definitions are still used in 
Serbian public discourse. Different actors, such as politicians, state officials 
and right wing groups are referring to women’s rights using arguments of 
“culture” and “tradition”. Moreover, in its observations regarding the im-
plementation of CEDAW, Serbia has “acknowledge[d] in paragraphs 100 
and 105 of its report that traditional views on the role of women and their 
status in society persist” (CEDAW/C/SRB/Q/2-3). After democratic changes 
in 2000 and the fall of Milošević regime, Serbia has chosen the path towards 
EU. Among many accession criteria is the obligation of the candidate state 
to guarantee the protection of human rights. Therefore, women’s and human 
1  I am using terms “culture” and “tradition” in inverted commas, as there is no 
consensus on their definition among anthropologists and other social scientists, and 
I “define” these terms as socially constructed, fluid, contested, relational, changing and 
dynamic.
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rights have been a part of every government’s agenda. Consequently, in 
order to meet relevant EU requirements, the Serbian parliament adopted 
several laws on human and women’s rights, (Council of the European 
Union, 2012) and expressed no reservation on CEDAW (CEDAW/C/SCG/
CO/1/CRP). This article explores the public discourse and the production 
of cultural meaning related to women’s rights in this particularly sensitive 
moment of struggle to obtain a date to open the negotiation process for 
joining the EU. How concepts of “tradition” and “culture” are used in ex-
plaining women’s rights and with what purpose? How do these arguments 
reflect the EU debate and how these arguments and the EU debate affect 
the women’s rights?
As Merry (2003) points out, in human rights discourse, particularly in 
CEDAW, “culture” is often seen as subordinating women while women’s 
rights and modernity are freeing them. The same view of “culture” and 
“tradition”, as this paper intends to show, is present in Serbian public dis-
course, where the fight for women’s rights becomes a fight against “backward 
mentality”, “tradition” (Nešić 2013), “rural thought” (Ramet 1996) and 
“Balkan’s re-traditionalisation” (Božilović 2010). On one hand, ruling state 
elites, which embrace women’s rights together with the EU perspective, are 
using the arguments of “culture” and “tradition” to explain encountered 
difficulties in the implementation of these rights. In this article, I argue that 
state officials use these arguments as an excuse, by blaming “tradition” for 
the inefficiency of the state to protect women’s rights. As a consequence of 
this, they turn the women’s rights fight into a fight against tradition 
(Merry 2003, Cowan 2001). On the other hand, right wing groups2 (“Dveri”, 
“Naši”, “1389”3) and the Serbian Orthodox Church present themselves as 
the protectors of “tradition” against “imposed Western values”. They also 
2  Some far right groups in Serbia, created a couple of decades ago as marginalised, 
religious, sport, sub cultural, para-political organisation gradually changed into le-
gitimate political parties. It has been estimated that almost 10% of Serbs voted for 
different far right representatives (CESID 2012).
3  “Dveri”, “Naši” and “1389” are three influential right wing organisations created 
in 1999 -“Dveri”, in 2004 - “Naši” and in 2005 -“1389”, declaring themselves as patri-
otic, non-government, non-profitable, aiming to “preserve tradition and […] [affirm] 
culture, historical, spiritual and other values of Serbian people[…]”(1389 2013). Those 
values are, for all three organisations, the Orthodox church […] and the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Serbia (against the independence of Kosovo). They all declare 
themselves as being firmly against Serbia entering EU and NATO and they proclaim 
state alliance with Russia. “Patriotism and family values are among our most important, 
basic principles. We are also developing campaigns against drug addiction and abortion” 
(1389 2013). “Dveri” is more intellectually oriented, and highly political, producing a 
lot of studies, written documents and academic papers in support of their theories, 
“Naši” is firmly fighting “traitors and foreign spies” (Naši 2013) by producing lists of 
enemies and organising marches against gay pride while “1389” declares itself open 
to new ideas and even has a part of their website in foreign languages (1389 2013).
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strongly oppose the EU integration process. In their view, “tradition”, con-
structed as a linear and static project of inherited “cultural” and “moral” 
values and practices, stands in opposition to the “shameful” and “per-
verted” Europe and calls to be nurtured and protected.
The result of this analysis hints that the EU process may not be incentive 
to further development of women’s rights in Serbia but rather likely to 
marginalize the issue by setting those rights among mandatory and un-
popular political EU conditions.4 This may explain the fear of some human 
rights activists that the EU may turn a blind eye on women issues if Serbia 
does fulfil “more important” political conditions, like the normalisation of 
Serbia’s relations with Kosovo, judicial reforms etc. (Mršević, personal in-
terview 27 Feb 2013).
The production of cultural meaning, especially in relation to Serbia’s EU-
accession and to the Serbian symbolic battlefield around “tradition”, “cul-
ture” and women’s rights, cannot be understood without knowing the 
patterns of the Western “orientalist discourse”5 (Said 1978) in which Balkans 
is perceived as unfinished and “uncivilised” Europe. Created a couple of 
centuries ago, mostly in France and Great Britain, this set of negative im-
ages on Balkans and Serbia has been resurrected during the Yugoslav wars 
of the 1990s and has been kept alive since, both internationally and lo-
cally, deeply affecting contemporary Serbia and, more precisely, the EU and 
the women’s rights discourse. This oriental discourse has its roots in early 
travel books in which the Balkans was perceived as a mystical, patriarchal, 
tribal and rural place. After World War I, it inspired the creation of new 
words (balkanization, to balkanize) designating the breaking up “into 
smaller and often hostile units” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2013). During 
fifty years of communism in the second half of the XX century, Yugoslavia 
was mainly known for its third way into socialism and an allied force dur-
ing World War II. However, the old patriarchal and tribal discourse made 
its forceful comeback in Western literature during Yugoslav wars (Drezgić 
and Žarkov 2006). As Drezgić and Žarkov (2006) notice, in most feminist 
academic literature regarding the Balkans and Serbia, men are presented 
as violent, misogynous warriors, while women are mostly defined as passive 
victims of the war (see Allcock 1991, Stiglmayer 1993). These revived 
“Western” media and cultural definitions of the Balkans and Serbia have 
4  Slow progression towards EU, unpopular political conditions (cooperation with the 
ICTY, Kosovo independence) made the public support to the EU integration process drop 
from 72 in 2002 to 41% in December 2012 (Serbia European Integration Office 2013).
5  The term describes what Said argued was an academic and artistic tradition of 
outsider interpretations of the East, based and shaped by prejudices and the European 
imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries.
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been adopted and also partly produced by regional and local academic and 
political actors; they have contributed to this image and perpetuated these 
“imagined geographies”(Bakić-Hyden 1992).
In that sense, Drezgić and Žarkov (2006) provided an excellent analysis of 
the work of Slavenka Drakulić, often perceived as “Simone de Beauvoir of 
Eastern Europe” and “Gloria Steinem of Socialism” and whose works re-
garding communism and wars in ex-Yugoslavia represent an “authority in 
the West” (Drezgić and Žarkov 2006: 293). Throughout examples from her 
work, they reveal how Western stereotypes of communism were reproduced 
and combined with descriptions of the “savage” Balkans. Authors demon-
strate how Drakulić demonises communism through metaphors of tumour 
and dark, brainwashed people whose mentality and system of beliefs needs 
exorcizing, depicting irrationality that is about to explode, women as pas-
sive victims without agency and the communist society divorced from all 
individual responsibility. Furthermore, the savageness of the Balkans is 
illustrated through the images of wars in ex-Yugoslavia and examples of 
nationalism and the rural, male brutality, where “rural” becomes almost an 
explanation for violence itself (Drezgić and Žarkov 2006: 293−296). This 
“rural” motive as an explanation of violence and nationalism may be found 
elsewhere, for example in the work of Ramet (1996: 78):
“The rural character of the Serbian national movement explains the move-
ment’s ʻtraditionalʼ values, which are stridently anti-feminist, strongly 
oriented towards the Serbian Orthodox Church, and laced with xenophobia: 
in short, the paradigmatic ʻtraditionalʼ values that one associates with the 
countryside. It is also significant that the increase in inter-ethnic violence 
that had already begun in earnest in 1990 was accompanied by a simul-
taneous increase in wife-beating in Serbia.”
As Todorova (1994) points out, “Balkanism and its subject are imprisoned 
in a field of discourse in which ʻBalkansʼ is paired in opposition to ʻWestʼ 
and ʻEuropeʼ, while ʻBalkanismʼ is the dark other of ‘Western civilizationʼ.
[…] the Balkans are left in Europe’s thrall, anti-civilization, alter ego, the 
dark side within”(Todorova 1994: 482). This is important to note, when 
examining the production of cultural meaning, especially in relation to 
Serbia’s EU-accession.
European Union has an important role in spreading women’s rights and 
different gender policies, such as, for example, gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming policies (Spehar 2011). However, the contemporary political 
discourse regarding the Western Balkans and its EU accession (which includes 
Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) stresses that “countries in this 
region have serious political and security problems, including the existence 
of intolerance, pathological nationalism and xenophobia, underdeveloped 
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democratic political culture and lacking the art of compromise” (Pritham 
2008, cited in Spehar 2011: 365).
Therefore, some Serbian academics believe that European integration of the 
Balkan countries implies, among other things, the release of their societies’ 
burdens of the past embodied in various traditionalist prejudices, super-
stitions, inferiority complexes or multiple values, habits, and mentalities 
(Božilović 2011: 114). Moreover, Božilović (2011: 117) argues that Serbia, 
since it belongs to the Balkans, still reflects strong tribal relations. As a 
consequence, he argues that Serbia should not count on support and aid 
from Europe, unless it gets rid of the negative burden of the past still present 
in people’s patterns of behaviour, such as hatred, contempt, envy, greed, 
hypocrisy, greed, deceit and malice. Therefore, the modernization, the de-
velopment of Balkans’ societies appears as a basic condition for its integration 
to the EU. In this way, this essentialist argument which reproduces the dis-
course of “Balkanism” (Todorova 1994) became strongly related to EU-ac-
cession, the perspective of which is described as a project of civilisation, of 
modernising and upbringing of the “savage” countries from the region.
As, arguably, the Western Balkans represent the most difficult set of pro-
spective accession countries so far encountered by the EU (in Spehar 2011: 
365), the described context – related to the Balkans, Serbia and the EU – 
frame women’s rights discourse in more than one way. These “imagined 
geographies”(Bakić-Hyden 1992), embraced as well as produced locally, 
define and generalise the Serbian context and “culture” as “rural”, “backward”, 
“barbarian”, “traditional”, “patriarchal” and “misogynous” while the imple-
mentation of women’s rights becomes related to the project of “modernisa-
tion”, “de-communisation”, “europeanisation” and “civilisation”. Describing 
them as “imagined geographies” (Bakić-Hyden 1992) does not qualify them 
as false or true, but stress the symbolic weight they contain, the generalised 
pictures they produce and the feelings they invoke.
Filipescu (2012) have identified the orientalist discourse in the enlargement 
documents of the European Union regarding the Western Balkans. The 
opposite may also be said: such academic and political discourses on the 
Balkans and Serbia shape the symbolic battlefield around EU in transi-
tional Serbia and reflect on the women’s rights. In order to examine in what 
way they do so, the next section of the article analyses relevant examples 
of the use of “culture” and “tradition” related to the women’s rights issue 
in Serbian public discourse in the recent past.
In 2009, when the Serbian government announced it would soon deliver 
a Law on Gender Equality, an important public debate on “Gender Equality 
in Serbia” was organised as a part of the project called “Democratic politi-
cal forum” which gave the floor to representatives from different subject 
fields, ministries, institutions and organisations such as the Director of 
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Gender Equality of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, several uni-
versity professors, the European Movement in Serbia, the Belgrade Centre 
for Human rights, Ombudsman, the Belgrade Fund for political Excellence, 
Incest trauma Centre – Belgrade, Centre for Gender Equality, Centre for 
Women’s Studies and Gender Research, The Centre For Democracy Foun-
dation, eminent political democratic leaders, researchers, journalists and 
many more.
Almost all actors in the debate agreed that the Serbian legislation is largely 
aligned primarily with the consolidated EU Directive in 2006, mostly in 
dealing with social and economic issues of gender equality. In this sense, 
they consented that Serbia would “at least not have a problem at the norma-
tive level, when the experts from the Commission and the Council of Europe 
come”, as Gasmi (2009) pointed out. Nevertheless, all participants agreed 
as well that the implementation of legal provisions was likely to be difficult. 
While some actors concentrated on political, economic and educational 
constrains which were compromising the implementation of gender equality 
provisions, others were using the argument of “tradition” and “culture” as 
being a significant obstacle to a successful implementation of the adopted 
legal framework. However, the static and essentialist notion of “tradition” 
and “culture” they used in their discourse was not meant to serve national-
istic interests and discredit the universality of human rights as Pollis (cited 
in Harris-Short 2003: 164) would point out, or to give misleading interpre-
tations of “culture”, but was rather used to demonstrate that state elites, 
favourable to the EU integration of Serbia, were favourable to women’s 
rights and gender equality standards as well, but were having difficulties to 
implement them. As those difficulties were related mainly to cultural tradi-
tion, it almost implied that the state should not be held responsible for them.
In this respect, the statement of an influential politician, philosopher, and 
– at the time – member of the parliament for the Democratic Party, Dragoljub 
Mićunović (2009), seems particularly illustrative:
“I see the problem of male-female relationships, above all, coming from 
a male oriented, criminal and traditional culture and this has been like 
that since the time of old epics and Greek tragedies through the present 
day. This affects society and shapes its values. There is no relationship 
between men and women that is not marked by endemic violence by men 
against women […] It comes from the depths of our society […] That is 
how our society is like and that is what comes from culture. We have to 
act against this anti-women, violent culture. Take ʻBuilding of Skadar on 
Bojanaʼ[traditional folk poem] as an example, and how they bricked up 
one unfortunate woman with her child. When epics like this are taught, 
we have to say it is a terrible shame and that this poem is not beautiful 
but hideous, disgusting. Thus, it is an attitude requiring a change of 
values. We should count on facing terrible resistance […]”.
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Furthermore, Mićunović (2009) argues that “no good law can help. The 
problem of the rule of law in Serbia is not so much in the lack of legal 
documents, but in their complete disregard”. What he failed to explain was 
by whom these laws were disregarded or who was responsible to enforce 
and implement legal provisions. At the time he delivered this statement, 
Mićunović was a member of the formerly governing Democratic Party, which 
introduced significant police and judiciary reforms during 2003, 2006 and 
2009 (EU Delegation to the Republic of Serbia 2012). These reforms, how-
ever, kept old inefficient strategies, procedures and less than mild punish-
ments penalties against violence and discrimination towards women is 
Serbia (EU Delegation to the Republic of Serbia 2012). The Coordinator of 
Safe houses and the Counselling Centre for domestic violence Stanojević 
(2013) argues that Serbia’s regulations to punish violence against women 
are nothing more than a dead letter on paper, as the prosecutors, the 
judges and the police does not seem willing to apply them during the 
criminal chain process. Proceedings are slow, inadequate and long, dis-
missal of criminal investigation or dismissal of court case frequent, sen-
tences are light and the protection of women by the police or during pro-
ceedings is rare and inefficient, she explains. Therefore, the number of 
victims has not been reduced, says Stanojević (2013). Moreover, she 
stresses out that legal provisions are wrongly interpreted and performed 
in practice in a discriminatory way, involving witnesses and victims going 
through secondary victimization (Stanojević 2013). This example makes 
it obvious that relevant institutional actors are actually contributing to 
further violations of women’s rights and that the state have failed to protect 
those it has the duty to protect, demonstrating its incapacity to deal with 
those issues through the system and existing institutions. On the contrary, 
“tradition”, “customs” and “backward culture” arguments in the discourse 
of state officials may be seen rather as an abuse of existing stereotypes, 
which consequently transfer the blame and the responsibility from the state 
to culture. As Ombudsman and LGBT rights defendant Mršević (2009) 
points out, most victims of violence with tragic consequences had been 
seeking help from public institutions and the police or social welfare centres 
years before the tragic event occurred. Therefore, it may be concluded that 
arguments of “tradition” or “culture” in the state officials’ public discourse 
in Serbia serve as an excuse for inaction, inefficient government policies 
and deeper socio-economic reasons for violations of women’s rights, as 
described by Harris-Short (2003).
At the other end of the Serbian public discourse, the use of “culture” and 
“tradition” as arguments in the public discourse regarding women’s rights is 
observed among right wing groups. These groups declare themselves as de-
fenders of Serbian “authentic tradition and culture” which is threatened by 
“imposed Western ideas” (groups like “Dveri”, “Naši”, “1389”). This example 
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illustrates Narayan’s (1997, cited in Lilly and Irvine 2007: 96) argument that 
nostalgic reactions are often present in non-Western societies as a reaction to 
the potential threats to the established gender roles. Following this, it may be 
said that in Serbia, the concepts of “culture” and “tradition” are used against 
the emerging new order, West and its dominant model of gender.
In Serbia, right wing groups use culture, which includes different cultural 
and religious symbols, myths and history, as a powerful nationalist and 
political tool. Although the instrumental use of tradition has never been 
absent from the Serbian society, as Naumović (1994) explains, being a part 
of different nationalistic and political projects through history, its particu-
larly powerful comeback is observed during the 80s and the 90s. The in-
strumental use of tradition in Serbia, according to the same author, includes 
three separate but interrelated set of phenomena. The first is the Serbian 
Orthodox tradition which involves the conceptual system, churches, mon-
asteries, frescoes and icons, religious rituals and holidays. The second set 
relates to the Serbian historical tradition (real and mythic images that 
people have about their state and national past), and the third set is em-
bodied in the folk, rural tradition. The instrumental use of tradition is a 
practice of manipulating with any of those sets (cited in Božilović 2010: 
116). Although the instrumental use of tradition in the last three decades 
of the Serbian past is mainly referred to as to the political manipulation 
from the government, especially at the time of Yugoslav wars, it continues 
to shape all aspects of public life in Serbia. However, one striking contem-
porary example of the instrumental use of tradition is observed in relation 
to human rights issues in general, and women’s rights in particular.
Bearing in mind that all right wing groups in Serbia share a similar approach 
to tradition, women and EU, in order to illustrate this, I shall analyse how 
the most influential6 among them, the nationalistic and pro-fascist7 or-
ganisation “Dveri”, uses the concept of “tradition” and “culture” and how 
it manipulates with different cultural, historical, political and religious 
symbols in building its arguments against women’s rights.
“What is the meaning of a new, extreme feminism, arising out of the Bol-
shevik, who is now being imposed not only to Serbia, but to all Christian 
nations of the world, under the guise of fighting for women’s rights?” asks 
6  During parliamentary elections in May 2012 “Dveri” almost crossed the threshold 
and succeeded in entering the local administration after the local elections. (CESID 2012)
7  As Kuljić (2002) and Griffin (2006) (cited in Stakić 2013: 2) point out that con-
temporary right wing extremism has routes in fascism. Stakić (2013: 2) gives a brief 
overview on different definitions of contemporary fascism and provides a theoretical 
common ground. According to her, contemporary fascism includes: anti-liberalism, 
anti-modernity, anti-communism, cult of tradition, extreme nationalism, conspiracy 
theory, anti-Semitism and romanticism with militarism.
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the organisation via its website. The question is answered through a set of 
mixed arguments against the communist heritage, the “imposed Western 
norms” and critiques of tradition, illustrated, among others, by Mićunović’s 
speech during the debate on “Gender equality in Serbia”. They begin with 
the critique of communism and its secularity:
“The 8 March, the day […] celebrated as the Day of Women only in 
Eastern Europe, which is still partially polluted by Communism, coincides 
with the day the Church celebrates the Finding of the Head of St. John 
the Forerunner. St. John’s head had been cut off by the lawless king Herod 
the Younger, at the urging of his wife Herodias […] the darkest female 
character in the New Testament […]. Herodias, unlike other women de-
scribed in the New Testament, is the personification of lust, malice and 
hatred towards everything that is holy. So the Communists, accidentally 
or not (inspired by the Father of lies) have selected [for the Women’s Day] 
the same day the Church celebrates the honourable head of St. John the 
Baptist, inviting women to follow the example of Herodias, a personification 
of darkness, sin and death, instead of following the example of the Holy 
Mother of God” (Dveri 2009).
According to the organisation, the “usurious globalization” and the EU, as 
the Satan’s kingdom or the Fourth Reich,8 should be blamed for putting the 
pressure on Serbia to implement the Law on Gender Equality. This imposi-
tion is based on false ideological assumptions that women are subordi-
nated and discriminated in all societies, that their opportunities to engage 
in politics are limited and that all differences between men and women 
ultimately lead to discrimination of the latter (Dveri 2009). It claims that 
this legal provision is based on promoting the androgynous concept of a 
human being and continues: “Authorities appoint their Commissioners for 
ʻgender equalityʼ anywhere and everywhere: they continue to claim that 
the other names of Serbia are misogyny and violence [….] because, of 
course, Serbian culture is more violent than others”. This argument illus-
trates both the reaction of “Dveri” to the Western “hegemonic” discourse 
on Serbia, as well as the organisation’s perception of women’s rights as an 
integral part of that “imposed” discourse. Women’s rights are perceived as 
something externally imposed and not as something genuinely important. 
Moreover, the organisation criticises Mićunović’s attack on tradition and 
culture and his ambition to influence the way some traditional folk poems 
are interpreted in schools: “by starting a legislation on gender equality [and 
by] attacking the poem ʻBuilding of Skadarʼ [they intend to] complete the 
creation of a society with no incest and no taboos, in which paedophilia is 
normal [leading, in the end to] the triumph of cyborgs” (Dveri 2009).
8  More on “Dveri’’ and their vision of EU can be found in a special issue for Easter 
2008 of their magazine Dveri srpske called EUtanasia. http://www.dverisrpske.com/
pdf/casopis/37 KosovoiEvropskaunija.pdf
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If we assume that all the members of this right wing group share the same 
feelings of being pressured, threatened and conditioned by the “hegemonic 
and perverted” West, then, they may, as described by the hedgehog theory9, 
tend to resist and reject all ideas or policies of a presumably Western origin. 
This is a response to the oriental discourse as well: “Finally, we are the 
Balkans, ʻthe Otherʼ in Europe, the screen where [the EU] is traditionally 
projecting its own negative side, and we look at ourselves through that 
Western pair of glasses, we see ourselves as backward, monstrous and all 
wrong” says Papan (2008), one of the right wing ideologists.
Although it would be interesting to explore whether members of this right 
wing group, either as a group or individually, really believe to be threatened 
or are just manipulating with this idea, it would require a research of the 
internal group organisation and ideology that goes beyond the scope of 
this paper. Analysing their website, however, shows how they construct the 
“authentic tradition” and how, by combining different religious, national 
or mythical symbols in opposition to communism and the West, they intend 
to “defend the nation” from “this new revolutionary ecstasy about democ-
racy, human rights and the EU integration” (Dveri 2009).
Consequently, some right wing groups published, in 2012, a “black list” of 
Serbian NGOs (Autonomous women center 2012) :
“There is a new wave of traditionalization in Serbia which is reflected in 
the strengthening the role of the church and right-wing organizations [...] 
There are 3 women’s NGOs out of 17 civil society organizations on the 
list of ʻundesirablesʼ (Women in Black, Autonomous Women’s Center and 
Reconstruction Women’s Fund)” (Autonomous women center 2012).
However, conservative ideas are not the exclusive property of right wing 
organisations. Some independent researchers, for example, use cultural 
arguments to discredit adopted legal provision regarding women’s rights 
on the basis of their incompatibility with the local context. Certain laws 
“simply cannot be implemented here, because they are essentially betraying 
the established patriarchal relations, which is not good” says a well-known 
criminologist for a wide-circulation newspaper (Nikolić 2012). This be-
trayal of established gender relations, explains Nikolić (2012), has led to 
a situation where mothers are spending the whole day at work, come 
home “frustrated” and therefore quarrel with their husbands. In this case, 
the argument of patriarchal tradition is given a positive connotation. 
Women’s agency should, according to him, be reduced to private sphere, 
to family and home, while the violence against women is described as a 
consequence of change in gender roles. Consequently, working women 
9  The hedgehog dilemma, in psychology, describes how people’s possible reactions 
to ostracism, or any other social rejection. (Maner et al. 2007)
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are to blame for playing an inappropriate role in a recommendable pa-
triarchal context.
Finally, regarding the use of notions of “culture” and “tradition” in Serbian 
public discourse, Malešević (2006, cited in Božilović 2010: 125) points to 
the complete marginalization of those aspects of Serbian tradition that are 
based on rationalism and the Enlightenment, the liberal and universal 
values of openness towards the other and all those elements of Serbian 
heritage that are complementary to the best aspects of European tradition.
Apart from the described problematic discourse going from the “civilising 
the savage” to “defending real Serbian traditional values”, women’s rights 
in transitional Serbia are also trapped inside the imperative obligation of 
abandoning “inappropriate” heritage and tradition related to communism. 
By this inappropriate heritage I mean everything that was created and 
installed by the former communist regime. In respect to this, we should 
bear in mind that most international women’s rights have not been alien 
to the local context, due to the country’s fifty years long communist past 
and to the significant role women had played as guerrilla fighters in the 
communist-led Yugoslav Liberation Army during the World War II. There-
fore, Yugoslav women were recognised as officially equal and were grant-
ed civil rights (Gudac-Dodić 2006). However, in a transitional context where 
the state seeks to distance itself from all its communist past, this positive 
heritage has been entirely left out from the public discourse.10
On the contrary, as Malešević (2006, cited in Božilović 2010: 125) stressed 
out, conservatism and patriarchy, xenophobia and primitivism with elements 
of hate speech remain unreasonably vital.
10  The debate on women’s position and women’s equality within Yugoslav com-
munism goes beyond the scope of this paper. On one hand, it is said that “After the 
success of the ʻpartisansʼ in suppressing the fascists, and the establishment of the Socialist 
Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Front of Women was disbanded by 
the Communist Party, on the basis that, under communism, women would have equal 
rights with men, and so there was no need to organise separately. However, communism 
has never effectively addressed the fact that societies throughout the world are patri-
archal, regardless of their political and economic structures. This means that there are 
a number of unwritten rules and regulations, implicit to our cultures, which explicitly 
disadvantage women” (Stanisavljević 1995: 37). In contrast, there is the argument that 
“In communist Yugoslavia, the Titoist programme was archetypally of the city. The 
emphasis on self-management (a model of decision making drawn from a specifically 
industrial context), like the accompanying efforts to promote secularism, gender equal-
ity, and ethnic coexistence all undercut the ethos of the village. Titoist politics was 
hostile to the political aspects of traditional culture, and made strong efforts to overcome 
traditional-rural prejudice against women, to erode the political authority of the 
Churches (always strongest in the countryside), and to anathematize all manifestations 
of nationalist sentiment, especially when translated into political programmes or de-
mands” (Ramet 1996: 76).
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Public actors in Serbia use the essentialist notion of “culture”, where culture 
is perceived as a static, shared, consensual and coherent system. This old 
notion of culture is a form of cultural essentialism that defines culture as 
a way of life, a property of the people who are the carriers of that culture. 
Culture, perceived in a static way that determines individual and collective 
identities (Grillo 2003), can be easily blamed for disadvantages or viola-
tions of human rights and this old, misread notion of culture makes it 
harder to spread and implement human rights (Merry 2003). Paradoxi-
cally, although – as we have examined – state representatives’ talk about 
culture conceals their incapacity to efficiently protect and implement 
women’s rights, by indirectly or directly putting the blame on “rural thought” 
and engaging in a fight against “tradition”, they actually do perpetuate 
“tradition” as an essentialist notion and consequently, it does become an 
issue. On the other hand, despite the fact that right wing conservative 
groups use different “cultural” and “traditional” arguments for different 
purposes than the pro-EU state officials, they keep perceiving culture in 
the same essentialist and static way, mainly in order to oppose the he-
gemony of the official discourse while spreading their nationalistic ideology 
or conservative ideas.
Presenting patriarchy, primitivism and misogyny as “Serbian tradition” is 
a form of politically ineffective essentialism. It perpetuates the post-war 
media and political discourse about Serbia people may easily find offensive, 
thus giving fuel to right wing groups to “defend the authentic tradition” 
and to discredit women’s rights and all policies coming from the “West”. 
As authenticity is just a historically specific dominant ideology, which can 
change over time (Asad 1979, cited in Wright 1998: 8), the official presen-
tation of “culture” and “tradition” in such ways normalises this problematic 
discourse without having the power to challenge it. Thus, the patriarchal 
and misogynous definitions of culture become a dominant discourse and 
unquestionable truths. This politicisation of “culture” is a form of ideology 
that becomes a prevalent way of thinking and in such a hegemonic system 
“culture” appears coherent and consensual (Wright 1998). As Merry (2003) 
points out, culture is not only a system of beliefs, it is also a product of in-
stitutional arrangements and legal provisions so, in this process, the state 
plays an important role in shaping culture and public opinion.
I strongly agree with authors who claim that human rights should be 
grounded in the local “culture” (Merry 2003, An Na’im 1990, Dundes 
Ruteln 1988); therefore, investigating the local context is important. Before 
blaming “culture” or “tradition” for the lack of implementation of women’s 
rights, all specific causes for gender inequality, violence against women 
and others structural obstacles on the ground as well as within institutions, 
laws and constitutions should be examined. The country will not advance 
on human rights matters if there is no honest political will to implement 
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and spread women’s rights through all state’s structures and official insti-
tutions such as education and social services. Unfortunately, it appears 
that Serbian government and state officials are willing to fight for the 
advancement of women’s rights only through legislation and because it is 
a condition set by the EU.
The analysis of the public discourse of different actors who have the 
power to define “culture” and “tradition” in relation to women’s rights in 
Serbia shows that women rights issues in Serbia are trapped into a pro-EU 
or against EU, pro-traditional values or pro-liberal values discourse, between 
tradition or modernity and that consequently, in the public discourse, 
women’s rights appear as a condition to access the EU rather than a genu-
inely important issue. I agree with Višnjić (2012) who evaluates women’s 
rights in Serbia as being a mere decoration of democracy. Therefore, in my 
view, women rights in Serbia, as a kind of collateral damage, are and prob-
ably will continue to be strongly affected and shaped in the future by the 
use and abuse of concepts of “culture” and “tradition”.
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Sara Petrovski
Kako upotreba „kulture“ i „tradicije“ oblikuje 
diskurs o ženskim pravima u tranzicionoj Srbiji?
Rezime
Iako su kul tur ni an tro po lo zi ma hom na pu sti li esen ci ja li stič ko vi đe nje „kul tu re“ i 
„tra di ci je“, nji ho ve sta tič ke de fi ni ci je su i da lje pri sut ne i če sto upo tre blja va ne u 
jav nom dis kur su o žen skim pra vi ma u Sr bi ji. Sma tra ju ći ana li zu pro iz vod nje ovih 
kul tur nih zna če nja od stra ne raz li či tih i re le vant nih dru štve nih ak te ra na dru štve no 
po li tič koj sce ni u Sr bi ji va žnom za raz u me va nje im ple men ta ci je, tran sfor ma ci je i 
za šti te žen skih pra va na lo kal nom ni vou, u član ku pro u ča vam na ko ji na čin de-
sni čar ske or ga ni za ci je, po li tič ki li de ri i in te lek tu al ci iz raz li či tih dru štve nih sfe ra, 
kao i Srp ska pra vo slav na cr kva, kon stru i šu i upo tre blja va ju „kul tu ru“ i „tra di ci ju“. 
Sa jed ne stra ne se ar gu men ti „kul tu re“ i „tra di ci je“ upo tre blja va ju u ci lju „za šti te 
na ci o nal nog iden ti te ta“ od „ na met nu tih za pad nih vred no sti“ i „za pad nog im pe-
ri ja li zma“. Sa dru ge stra ne, oni slu že da oprav da ju kul tur ne po te ško će sa ko ji ma 
se su sre ću dr žav ne in sti tu ci je i dru gi re le van ti ak te ri u pro ce su za šti te žen skih 
pra va, gde je „tra di ci ja“ če sto per ci pi ra na kao ne u pit ni, li ne ar ni pro je kat na sle-
đe nih „kul tur nih“ i „mo ral nih“ vred no sti i prak si ko je su u su prot no sti sa po li ti kom 
i kul tur nim vred no sti ma Evrop ske uni je. U skla du sa tim, „tra di ci ja“ mo ra bi ti ili 
bra nje na i za šti će na, ili iz me nje na i na pu šte na. Po sle di ca to ga je da su žen ska 
pra va uple te na u dis kurs o bor bi za ili pro tiv EU, za ili pro tiv „tra di ci je“ ko ja sto ji 
na su prot „mo der nim“ i „li be ral nim“ vred no sti ma. Za klju ču jem da upo tre ba i in-
stru men ta li za ci ja raz li či tih kon ce pa ta „kul tu re“ i „tra di ci je“ na mno go na či na 
uti če na raz u me va nje, pri hva ta nje i za šti tu žen skih pra va u Sr bi ji.
Ključ ne re či: kul tu ra, tra di ci ja, žen ska pra va, jav ni dis kurs, Evrop ska uni ja, Sr bi ja, 
Bal kan
